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Description

On November 18, 2026, F5 released NGINX Open Source 1.30.7 (stable) and 1.31.9 (mainline) together with updated NGINX Plus builds, and published advisories for ten vulnerabilities. Five of them, all rated Critical by F5 under CVSS v4.0, are memory corruption flaws that a remote, unauthenticated attacker can trigger. According to F5, each can crash an NGINX worker process or corrupt its memory, and can lead to code execution when Address Space Layout Randomization (ASLR) is disabled or bypassed.

Xint, the research team that F5 credits on all five CVE records, named the set "nginx2root". Each flaw is a separate attack path that requires a different configuration:

  • CVE-2026-123007 (HTTP/2 flow control): A heap buffer overflow in configurations that use HTTP/2; the flow control window can exceed the allowed threshold.
  • CVE-2026-123633 (HTTP/2 with proxying): A use-after-free when NGINX accepts HTTP/2 client connections, passes the requests to a backend, and the worker process is running low on worker_connections; in Xint's test, the attacker's own connections created that shortage.
  • CVE-2026-121810 (HTTP/3): A use-after-free in configurations that use HTTP/3. F5 adds that exploitation depends on conditions beyond the attacker's control.
  • CVE-2026-123634 (resolver): A use-after-free when the proxied server name contains variables and a Server Side Includes (SSI) or mirror subrequest resolves the same name.
  • CVE-2026-113425 (mail proxy): A use-after-free when NGINX is configured as a mail proxy, triggered by unauthenticated traffic.

Xint and Wiz Research (which independently found the two HTTP/2 flaws) report that the flaws themselves leak memory addresses, so that ASLR does not prevent exploitation. Xint reports command execution as the NGINX worker process through CVE-2026-123007 in its own tests on AWS, GCP, and Azure, including over a public HTTPS endpoint, and exploits for the other four flaws. F5's CVE records do not address these results, and both teams are withholding their exploits.

Rapid7, also credited for CVE-2026-123007, published exploit code that bypasses ASLR and executes a command against a freshly started Docker container of the official NGINX 1.31.8 image, plus a simpler script that crashes a worker process. The public exploit needs about 128 GB of HTTP/2 traffic and a specific glibc memcpy on AVX-512 processors, and will likely fail against a busy server or behind another proxy; Xint reports that its own unreleased exploit works under concurrent traffic and on different hardware.

Xint also reports a use-after-free in the SCTP code of the Linux kernel, present since v4.15. Chained with CVE-2026-123007, it gave Xint root on the host, including from NGINX inside a Docker container; whether SCTP is reachable depends on the kernel, its modules, and the container's restrictions. According to Xint, no kernel fix was available at disclosure.

At the time of writing (November 19, 2026), no exploitation in the wild has been reported and none of the five CVEs is listed in the CISA KEV catalog. Because public exploit code exists for CVE-2026-123007, patch servers with HTTP/2 enabled first.

  • Severity: Critical
  • CVSS Score: 9.2 (CVSS v4.0, rated by F5 for each of the five CVEs, CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:H/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N); 8.1 under CVSS v3.1 (CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H)
  • CWE-191: Integer Underflow (Wrap or Wraparound), CVE-2026-123007
  • CWE-787: Out-of-bounds Write, CVE-2026-123007
  • CWE-416: Use After Free, the other four CVEs

Scope of Impact

Affected versions and patches according to F5 and nginx.org:

  • NGINX Open Source: 1.31.0 to 1.31.8 and all versions before 1.30.7 are affected, starting from 1.9.5 (CVE-2026-123007), 1.19.7 (CVE-2026-123633), 1.25.0 (CVE-2026-121810), 0.6.18 (CVE-2026-123634), and 0.5.33 (CVE-2026-113425); upgrade to 1.30.7 or 1.31.9, because 1.29.x and older branches receive no fix.
  • NGINX Plus: 37.0.0 before 37.0.8.1 and 37.1.0 before 37.3.0.1 are affected; upgrade to 37.0.8.1 or 37.3.0.1. R33 and later R releases are also listed as affected, and F5 names fixed builds only in the 37.x series.
  • Other fixes in the same releases: Five more CVEs, including CVE-2026-118899, an unauthenticated denial of service on HTTPS servers with TLS 1.3, which is enabled by default (CVSS v4.0 8.7, no workaround).

Software built on NGINX carries the same code and is fixed on its own schedule:

  • Linux distribution packages: Fixes are backported without changing the version that nginx -v reports, so check the package version against the distribution's security tracker. At the time of writing, Ubuntu and Debian still list their stable releases as vulnerable to CVE-2026-123007.
  • OpenResty: 1.31.8.1 is based on NGINX 1.31.8; no fixed release had been published at the time of writing.
  • Kubernetes ingress-nginx: The upstream project was archived in March 2026 and receives no security fixes. Its last release bundles NGINX 1.27.1 with HTTP/2 enabled by default, so both HTTP/2 flaws are in scope.

A server is exposed to a flaw only when the feature that contains it (HTTP/2, HTTP/3, the resolver with variables in a proxied server name, or the mail proxy) is enabled and reachable by the attacker. Check the version, the configuration on disk, and the binary of the running process:

# Version and optional modules (HTTP/2, HTTP/3, mail)
nginx -v
nginx -V 2>&1 | tr ' ' '\n' | grep -E 'http_v2|http_v3|with-mail'

# Configuration on disk: directives that the five flaws depend on (fix any "test failed" error first)
sudo nginx -T | grep -vE '^[[:space:]]*#' | grep -E 'http2|http3|quic|resolver|mirror|ssi[[:space:]]+on|(proxy|grpc|fastcgi|uwsgi|scgi)_pass[^;]*\$|^[[:space:]]*mail([[:space:]]|\{|$)|auth_http'

# From outside, per server name: "ALPN protocol: h2" = HTTP/2 accepted, "No ALPN negotiated" = not accepted
HOST=www.example.com
openssl s_client -alpn h2 -connect "$HOST:443" -servername "$HOST" </dev/null 2>/dev/null | grep ALPN

# "(deleted)" means NGINX was upgraded on disk but the old binary is still running
for pid in $(pgrep -f 'nginx: master process'); do sudo ls -l "/proc/$pid/exe"; done

Impact

F5 rates the impact on confidentiality, integrity, and availability as High for all five flaws. Successful exploitation of the vulnerabilities can lead to:

  • Remote code execution: An unauthenticated attacker runs code with the privileges of the NGINX worker process (conditional on an ASLR bypass according to F5; see the researcher results above).
  • Denial of service: A crashed worker process drops all of its connections, and repeated crashes disrupt every site served by the instance.
  • Data exposure: A compromised worker process can read TLS private keys, upstream credentials, and the traffic of every site behind the instance, alter served content, and attack backend services that trust the proxy.
  • Host compromise: Xint reports that chaining CVE-2026-123007 with a Linux kernel SCTP flaw, for which it says no fix exists yet, gave root on the host, including escape from a Docker container.

Mitigation

Upgrading to a fixed build is the only complete remediation; the other steps below reduce exposure until the patch is applied:

  • Inventory: Find every NGINX instance: OS packages, container images, Kubernetes ingress controllers, and copies bundled in other products. Check the binary of the running process, not only the installed package.
  • Upgrade: Move NGINX Open Source to 1.30.7 or 1.31.9 and NGINX Plus to 37.0.8.1 or 37.3.0.1, or install the fixed package from your distribution or product vendor as soon as it is available. Then restart NGINX and rebuild and redeploy container images; a configuration reload (nginx -s reload) does not replace the running executable.
  • Disable HTTP/2 until patched: This blocks CVE-2026-123007 and CVE-2026-123633 (recommended by Wiz and Xint; F5 lists no workaround). Remove the http2 parameter from every listen directive and, on NGINX 1.25.1 and later, change every http2 on; to http2 off;. A single leftover keeps HTTP/2 enabled, and versions before 1.25.1 reject the http2 directive. Clients fall back to HTTP/1.1, but native gRPC stops working. Run sudo nginx -t, then restart NGINX, because a reload leaves old worker processes serving existing HTTP/2 connections. Repeat the openssl check above; the expected result is No ALPN negotiated.
  • ingress-nginx: Set use-http2: "false" in the controller ConfigMap and restart the controller pods. Plan the move to a maintained ingress controller, and check that it ships a fixed NGINX.
  • HTTP/3 (CVE-2026-121810): Remove every listen ... quic directive (Xint); http3 off; alone leaves the UDP socket open.
  • Resolver (CVE-2026-123634): Avoid SSI, mirror, and variables in the proxied server name, for example in proxy_pass (F5). A name without variables is resolved only when NGINX starts or reloads.
  • Mail proxy (CVE-2026-113425): Restrict mail proxy listeners to trusted networks (F5).
  • Linux kernel SCTP: On hosts that do not use SCTP, block the kernel module until a kernel fix is released (Xint): put install sctp /bin/false in a .conf file under /etc/modprobe.d/ on the host or Kubernetes node, not inside a container. This does not unload a module that is already loaded or disable SCTP built into the kernel.
  • CDN and WAF: A CDN or reverse proxy that terminates HTTP/2 in front of NGINX may break the HTTP/2 exploits (Wiz, Rapid7, Cloudflare), but only when the origin cannot be reached directly; treat it as risk reduction, not a fix. A layer 4 load balancer or TLS passthrough does not terminate HTTP/2 and gives no protection. Do not rely on WAF rules; according to Cloudflare, they cannot reliably match these flaws.
  • Monitoring: Watch for programs started by an NGINX worker process (the clearest sign of compromise according to Xint), repeated worker crashes, and long-lived HTTP/2 connections whose received bytes keep growing while few requests are logged. The audit rule below records only events after it is added. If a worker has started a program, treat the host as compromised and rotate TLS keys and upstream credentials.
# Record every program started by the worker user: the value of the `user` directive (nginx; www-data on Debian and Ubuntu)
NGINX_USER=nginx
sudo auditctl -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S execve -S execveat -F uid="$NGINX_USER" -k nginx_exec
sudo auditctl -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S execve -S execveat -F uid="$NGINX_USER" -k nginx_exec
sudo ausearch -k nginx_exec -i

# Worker crashes, including rotated logs (for containers, read the container logs instead)
sudo zgrep -h 'exited on signal' /var/log/nginx/error.log*

Use the following prompt with an AI agent that can access your infrastructure to run a read-only assessment. Give the agent read-only credentials, because the prompt alone does not stop it from making changes, and review its results before acting on them.

Read-only assessment: which of my NGINX instances are affected by nginx2root? Reference: https://greennode.ai/security-advisories/nginx2root. Do not exploit, change, reload, or restart anything.

For every NGINX instance (hosts, GreenNode vServer instances, VKS and other Kubernetes ingress controllers, container images, bundled copies such as OpenResty), record:
- Installed package version, binary version (nginx -v), and whether the running process is an older binary (/proc/<pid>/exe ends in "(deleted)")
- Features enabled in nginx -T: HTTP/2, HTTP/3, mail proxy, resolver with variables in a proxied server name, SSI or mirror; do not copy the configuration or any secret into the report
- Internet reachability (public or floating IP, load balancer, ingress)

Patched: NGINX Open Source 1.30.x from 1.30.7, or 1.31.9 and later; NGINX Plus 37.0.x from 37.0.8.1, or 37.3.0.1 and later; a distribution or vendor package that its own advisory lists as fixed.

Status:
- Fixed: the running process is patched
- Exposed: unpatched, with HTTP/2, HTTP/3, or the mail proxy enabled, or with a resolver, variables in a proxied server name, and SSI or mirror together
- Not exposed: unpatched, with none of the above; it still needs the upgrade
- Unknown: version or configuration could not be read

Return one table row per instance with its versions, features, status, and next action, then list what you could not assess.

References